Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried’s Speech to the Missile Defense Panel at Krynica World Economic Forum

Sept. 6, 2007

Thank you.

This panel’s topic is missile defense.  It has been my honor to have spent much of my career working on Polish affairs, and so I look with some wonder at the favorable historical circumstances that form the unspoken subtext to this topic.  We are, after all, discussing security arrangements that affect the world from a Poland that is free, a member of NATO, and a formal, treaty ally of the United States.  Poland is subject, not object.  We are not forced, thank God, to discuss Poland’s fate or future, because Poles themselves have chosen Poland’s course and Poland’s place in a Europe whole, free and at peace.  I realize that this auspicious account may seem out of place given the current political climate in Poland.  But as an American, I easily note that we all have our politics.

Poland is by no means a passive ally or a consumer of security.  On the contrary, Poland has emerged as one of our most active, most contributing, and most strategic allies.  And yes, sometimes a fighting ally.

This is no surprise given Polish history.  Poland has surely learned that security is indivisible; that no matter how removed one may feel from events far away, complacency is fool’s gold.  Poland and its neighbors remember well the words Neville Chamberlain used to justify appeasement in 1938.  Chamberlain said:

“How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is, that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.”

Chamberlain was wrong, of course, and as Lech Walesa later put it, if you are not willing to die for Gdansk, you may be forced to die for London or Paris.  The point, of course, is that changes far away can affect our security – this is the context of our dynamics today.  

But Poland and the countries of Central Europe, like the Czech Republic, are no longer vulnerable objects of others’ design.  As free nations, you are in a position to shape the world to avoid a repeat of Chamberlain’s errors.  It was not surprising therefore when Poland was the first ally to respond to last year’s request by NATO for members to send more troops to Afghanistan.  And this was no symbolic contribution:  Poland sent in a full combat battalion, and these soldiers are operating without caveats, sharing all dangers with us.  We have had our losses.  On behalf of my government I want to extend my gratitude to the Polish people.  I also want to extend our condolences to the family of Second Lieutenant Lukasz Kurowski, killed in the line of duty in Gardez in Paktia Province on Aug. 14.

This forms the context of our topic.  There is much misunderstanding about the missile defense system we are proposing.  Perhaps we should have found a more fitting name for it, such as Allied Missile Defense or Sovereignty Defense.  What we are proposing, after all, is simply a system that will make safer the nations and people of Europe and America, and for our governments to function free of blackmail from rogue regimes.

I want to cover three general areas:

• First, I want to talk about the strategic challenge that missile defense is intended to address and why this is different from the nuclear challenge of the Cold War.  I am talking about the danger posed by regimes with grand messianic aspirations and potentially a fistful of missiles and nuclear weapons.  I will also briefly describe the missile program that we envision and are discussing with the Polish government later this week.
• Second, I will explain why this program is not and cannot be directed against Russia.  We know that, and the Russians know that.  
• Lastly, I am going to explain how a properly integrated, multilateral system of missile defense can strengthen the transatlantic community, indeed, strengthen security with Russia as well.  

The Strategic Case.  Let us consider the strategic challenge we face at the start of the 21st century and how it differs from what the West confronted during the Cold War.

Remember, in the decades of the Cold War, two nations with substantially equal nuclear arsenals confronted each other.  To keep a chilly peace, we came to rely on the logic of what was called Mutually Assured Destruction – MAD in its famous acronym.  Under MAD, we left ourselves and our allies nearly completely vulnerable to nuclear attack, relying on the threat of retaliation to nuclear and potentially even non-nuclear attack.  MAD’s inherent logic seemed valid when losses would be symmetrical.

But, what a horrendous choice – to match the certain slaughter of millions in one’s own country, by ordering the death of millions more.  The logic of that was horrible, and we should be careful not to repeat it in the 21st century.

Today, the source of danger comes from unstable regimes, of which Iran and North Korea are but two.  Other rogue states may arise over the next 20 years.  These regimes may come to possess nuclear weapons and missiles.

And these countries will have the opportunities to do so.  Technology transfers and weapons proliferation have become easier.  Iran already possesses many medium- to short-range missiles.  Its Shahab 3 missile is capable, today, of reaching targets in southeast Europe.  And Iran’s missile technology will not stay put.  We believe that Iran could have long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe before 2015 if it chooses to develop them.

The prospect of an Iranian strategic nuclear arsenal is worrying, especially given its threatening rhetoric, including that of its Holocaust-denying President.

Iran would be able to use it to deter Europe while using its power – conventional and through support for terrorist proxies – throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Of course we want first of all to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.  We have been trying through the UNSC and diplomatically, and have made some progress.  But Iran’s enrichment program is continuing.  We cannot assume success.

If Iran succeeds, what are the options in response?

First, one could pretend the problem does not exist, or is a far away problem of which we need know nothing.  Given my earlier invocation of the spirit of Neville Chamberlain, you can imagine my view of this option.

Our second option, spoken of by some is pre-emptive strike.  But military action is easier to advocate than implement, and the consequences can be serious and not what one intended.  This is not a desirable option.  A pre-emptive strike in a situation of political crisis is easier said than done.

Third, one could take steps to manage the impact of a nuclear-armed Iran, should our best diplomatic efforts not succeed.  This is the system we are proposing here.  Realism forces us to consider this eventuality.

But consider this our response in this case. Are we simply to dust off Cold War-era strategic concepts?  Do we really think that MAD is the best option?  To put it another way, is our best option absolute vulnerability to a potential Iranian nuclear arsenal and the threat of nuclear or massive conventional retaliation in response?  Is this truly the best we can do?

It is these considerations that have led my government to look at strategic missile defense as one element of a long-term, stabilizing response to the strategic challenge I outlined.  Simply put:  missile defense makes the job of managing a modest Iranian, North Korean, or some other country’s nuclear arsenal far easier.  And that would be because a missile defense system would make the threat of the Iranian arsenal relative rather than absolute.

The purpose of the modest missile defense systems we have built in the United States and seek to develop in Europe is to reduce the threat from Iran and the Middle East and to raise reasonable doubt in the minds of would-be aggressors about the effectiveness of their systems.

We Americans cannot limit our thinking to our own, unilateral, national security.  Transatlantic security is indivisible.  If Europe is not secure, the U.S. is not secure.  We cannot decouple U.S. security from that of our NATO allies.  

This in short is the strategic, conceptual case for missile defense.  This is why we plan, with the support and participation of the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland – and we hope, the background of growing support within NATO for NATO missile defenses – to build facilities for radar and 10, unarmed, interceptor missiles.  Geography and geometry tell us that Poland and the Czech Republic are the best locations for these systems if the object is to defend the United States and most of Europe against missiles from the Middle East and Iran.

The Russia Dimension.  Curiously, most of the discussion in Europe about missile defense has been shaped by Russia’s sharp reaction against it.  Our proposed missiles would have no offensive capability and no capability at all against a Russian missile. The Russians know this.  President Bush and President Putin have discussed this and we have held two rounds of meetings with the Russians to discuss the subject.  

While we are committed to trying to work with Russia, we are troubled by Russia’s rhetoric about missile defense, including the language used by some Russian officials and their pressure and even threats against Poland and the Czech Republic.  Russia’s overwrought protestations may have less to do with a genuine perception of a threat than with a desire to put into question the right of Poland and the Czech Republic to make their own decisions about security.

The United States does not recognize any Russian right of veto over the countries of Central Europe or their sovereign decisions.  Neither Poland, nor the Czech Republic nor any other country of this region has an asterisk next to its name or a footnote that would qualify its freedom regained after 1989.

The reality of cooperation with Russia, however, can get us past rhetoric that belongs in another era.  How much we can actually cooperate with Russia will depend largely on Russia.  We are fully prepared for cooperation.  Russia is not the problem we are trying to solve, but Russia, we hope, can be part of the solution, in genuine partnership.

The Multilateral Solution.  We seek a multilateral answer to a common security problem.  No nation, including the United States, can find security unilaterally.  Missile defense responds to a common strategic challenge and the answer should be common within our alliance.  Our missile defense plans are intended to couple the United States with Poland and the Czech Republic; with Russia, if Russia is willing; and with NATO.

We do not seek an American unilateral defense system based in Poland and the Czech Republic, but rather a system that brings us all onto the same grid.  That is what we are discussing in multilateral fora.  Just as the United States has undertaken obligations to help defend Poland and the Czech Republic, Poles and Czechs can be proud of the contribution to collective defense that missile defense facilities based in Central Europe can make.

Of course we appreciate Poland’s point that missile defense must also increase Poland’s national security.  In our negotiations with Poland, we are already discussing what this means, especially given Russian rhetoric.  Our defense relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic will doubtless grow as our missile defense cooperation advances.

And of course the U.S. has engaged NATO in missile defense.  We hope to do more and especially hope that the Europeans who call for greater emphasis on multilateral efforts will help.  Happily, the process of building a NATO approach to missile defense has already begun.  At last year’s Riga Summit, NATO allies determined to continue work on aspects of missile defense for the Alliance.  We welcome the report that NATO experts aim to complete by February regarding how short-range anti-missile defenses fit into an overall missile defense strategy.

U.S. missile defense efforts can contribute to this broader NATO approach to missile defense.  By connecting radar systems and combining the proposed long-range U.S. missile defense system with shorter range systems deployed by NATO Allies, we can protect all NATO territory from ballistic missiles threats from the Middle East, hence creating a more effective defense for all of Europe.  Our aim, in short, is to develop missile defense as broadly and multilaterally as we can, with NATO, national, and Russian or NATO-Russian elements.

This is all a work in progress.  We want to see missile defense emerge as a unifying factor within the alliance and, if they are ready, with Russia.

What we seek is security in the face of new challenges, and security together, as an alliance rooted in a common commitment to freedom.

I appreciate your time and attention.