NATO Missile Defense Activities
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program (ALTBMD)
Oversight provided by the ALTBMD Steering Committee,
The goal of the ALTBMD Program is to develop and field a command and control structure that will organize a “system of systems” defense for the protection of NATO forces on “out of area” deployments by 2010.
Theatre missile defense systems owned and operated by individual NATO member states, (i.e. US Patriot and French SAMP-T), will be linked via a common command and control system to protect NATO troops from SCUD and NO-DONG type theatre ballistic missiles (TBMs).
The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) will integrate these national systems and comprise backbone of the ALTBMD infrastructure.
NATO will develop Integrated Test Beds at The Hague and in Glons, Belgium to ensure national systems are compatible and interoperable with ACCS and to test software updates as technology matures
The ALTBMD Program is established and funded. The ALTBMD Programme Management Office (ALTBMD PMO) began operations in September 2005.
NATO agreed to commonly fund the program cost of 700 Million Euro and to work towards achieving an ALTBMD capability by 2010.
Missile Defense Project Group
NATO’s Prague Summit declaration (21 November 2002) committed member states to a NATO feasibility study to examine “options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence”.
The study lays the technical foundation for the pol-mil discussions that are currently underway in the Executive Working Group (Reinforced). The EWG (R) is delivered its “Interim Report on Missile Defence” to the North Atlantic Council in November 2006. The Report was “noted” by the Heads of State and Government during the Riga Summit. However, a program decision was not made. Rather, the HOSGs merely directed that NATO should continue to study the issue.
The official statement coming out of Riga was,
At Prague we initiated a Missile Defence Feasibility Study in response to the increasing missile threat. We welcome its recent completion. It concludes that missile defence is technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study. We tasked continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update on missile threat developments.
Since Riga, the EWG (R) has been discussing the “desirability” of a Missile Defense capability to protect NATO territory and population centers. Progress has been painfully slow due to the reluctance of key nations to actively address this issue. It is hoped that the EWG (R) could make some kind of recommendation by the end of this year, but this is probably not realistic.
MDFS Key Conclusions
The threat of long-range missile attack on NATO territory is real and growing
Protection of NATO territory and population centers is technically feasible and can provide protection from a full spectrum of missile threats.
The current NATO missile defense program (ALTBMD) cannot protect all of its population centers and territory.
Defenses that can hit enemy missiles in mid-course at very high altitude or in space are needed, but only a small number of interceptor sites (3 or 4) are needed.
The system will need multiple sensor systems to track and target enemy missiles, including ground-based and satellite systems
US Position
The number of missiles capable of targeting NATO Europe is growing
Missile Defense of NATO Europe is feasible and desirable
Midcourse intercept capability is required to defend against the full range of missiles capable of targeting NATO Europe
Non-real time planning and consultation will need to occur at NATO regardless of whether the systems are controlled by NATO or the nations, and NATO must identify a forum for missile defense consultations to occur
National systems can contribute to the defense of NATO Europe and augment capabilities of NATO-controlled assets (i.e. US Third Site)
The cost of missile defense for NATO will be contingent upon its preference for procuring NATO-owned systems or integration of national systems
Selection of the US Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) is the earliest midcourse defense option due to its high technology readiness level and maturity
GBI is virtually “off the shelf” technology and has undergone improvements to increase reliability and quality since the MDFS began in 2004
