Moscow's Missile Defense Bluster

The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2007

By Marshall Billingslea

Russian reactions to the discussions among Poland, the Czech Republic and the United States on a missile defense system in Europe have been disconcerting. Some of the rhetoric in past days -- such as Monday's blunt threats by Lt. Gen. Igor Khvorov to target European missile defense sites with bombers, or intimations by other Russian officials of scrapping the 1987 INF Treaty (which bans short- and medium-range nuclear missiles) -- is a throwback to a bygone era that needs to stay gone.

Moscow should be well aware that the proposed defense installations are focused on the emerging Iranian threat. Russian defense planners surely understand the physics and geography of the potential deployment, and know that a Czech radar facing south and 10 interceptors in Poland pose no threat to the credibility of the Russian deterrent of thousands of warheads. It would be physically impossible for interceptors in Poland to chase down Russian ICBMs headed toward North America. The Russian ICBMs move too fast, and defensive interceptors cannot win such a "tail chase."

Nor could they get out of their silos fast enough to protect Europe from a Russian missile attack, even if the radar were facing in that direction, which it wouldn't be. The radar would not be able to see incoming Russian missiles in time, and -- again -- the interceptors would be thrown into a losing tail chase. In other words, the system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic is clearly designed to protect against Iran, and not against Russia. No doubt about it.

Unlike the NATO nations, who are in the early stages of developing missile defenses, Russia has long possessed its own antiballistic missile defense for its capital, making recent Russian protests even more perplexing. What's more, the Kremlin has been deeply engaged in theater missile defense cooperation with NATO.

The NATO alliance and Russia have done complex modeling and simulations, improving one another's understanding of how to defend against short-range missiles. Through the NATO-Russia Council, they have conducted multiple joint exercises and developed the command-and-control mechanisms needed to jointly defend territory from attack -- Russian troops working alongside NATO forces. Moreover, NATO has consistently held open the option for deeper Russian involvement in missile defense work. Recent rhetoric aside, this is not an adversarial relationship; it has been a highly positive, friendly one.

For these reasons, one would think that the missile defense system being discussed by the Czech Republic, Poland and the U.S. would be uncontroversial and widely applauded, including by Russia. Iran's nuclear ambitions and defiance of the United Nations Security Council (of which Russia is a permanent member), combined with its aggressive missile-testing program and plans for a "satellite launch" with a multi-ton rocket, would seem to be compelling reasons for multinational cooperation on such a protection.

Recall that Iran already has a small number of ballistic missiles capable of hitting some NATO members, and that it clearly wants the ability to target all of Europe and North America. Together with its crash nuclear program, Iran's missile ambitions are worrisome enough. But Tehran's aggressive behavior is a source of even greater concern.

This past summer, the terrorist group Hezbollah began firing barrages of Iranian-supplied missiles at Israeli cities. Now there is overwhelming evidence that Iran is supplying terrorists in Iraq with advanced weapons; the proof ranges from seizure of sophisticated Iranian-produced explosives in insurgent stockpiles to the actual capture of Iranian operatives.

We face today a volatile mix: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hostility toward Israel and the West; material support by elements of the Iranian military to terrorist groups; and spinning nuclear centrifuges and missile tests. What better set of reasons is there for friendly nations to work closely together on building effective defenses for their populations?

The beauty of the system under discussion for Europe lies in its planned capabilities, its small footprint and the speed with which it could be deployed. The technology involved has been proven and tested. In fact, the U.S. has already deployed such a system against North Korea. The same basic approach -- building a radar, deploying a handful of interceptors and linking the system to a communications network that includes several other NATO allies -- will provide a defense of Europe and enhanced protection of North America against long-range missile attacks from the Middle East.

A second advantage is that a missile shield over Europe would further preserve and strengthen Alliance solidarity in the face of real and growing threats. As NATO's secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has repeatedly pointed out, the security of the alliance should be "indivisible." It is a good thing that some allies, such as the U.S., already have a missile shield. But should not all NATO partners be afforded such protection?

While NATO has invested a great deal of time and effort developing an overall plan for protecting the European continent from all types of missile attack, so far it has chosen to focus only on the shorter-range threats. At the recent summit in Riga, Latvia, NATO signed its first contract for a robust, mobile defense against shorter-range missiles (such as the ones Iran already has in its inventory). The broader Czech-Polish-U.S. initiative, while not a NATO program per se, will nevertheless fill the remaining capability gap against longer-range threats. When integrated with the NATO missile defense programs, this will provide a truly "layered" defense of Europe.

Rather than squaring off over the issue of missile defense, policy makers should take a hard look at the real security threat: the behavior of rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea. In the case of Iran, Russia could choose to play a decisive role by terminating the flow of technology into worrisome nuclear programs and continuing to signal resolve through the U.N. Security Council.

All nations have an inherent right to defend themselves. Indeed, it is an obligation for democratic governments. With Russian help, we could ensure that missile defense is not the last and only line of defense against Iran.

Mr. Billingslea is a former assistant secretary general of NATO and former chairman of the NATO-Russia Council's ad hoc working group on theater missile defense.  

Reprinted with permission of The Wall Street Journal © 2007 Dow Jones & Company. All rights reserved.