MISSILE DEFENSE PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE
5. Addressing Concerns
1. Why the sudden concern?
Reality and timing of Iranian threat
• Defenses take years to deploy. Work on missile defense in Europe must begin now in order to meet the growing threat from Iran
• Iran has demonstrated the capability to develop, and intent to use, ballistic missiles of increasingly longer range (they currently have short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) technology)
• Public announcement of space-launch vehicle test success (U.S. cannot confi rm)
• In 1998, intelligence experts indicated North Korea was years away from testing multi-stage rockets; the next month, they tested this capability. We cannot afford to be surprised by waking up one morning and discovering that Iran has an ICBM capability
2. How do we know the system is effective and safe?
In 2003, ballistic missile defenses consistently demonstrated the ability to effectively intercept short-range enemy missile attacks during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 intercepted nine out of nine short-range ballistic missiles. Defenses against intermediate- and longrange attacks have not yet been needed in war. Through ground and flight tests, and modeling and simulation, such defenses have been repeatedly and successfully tested over the past decade. Hit-to-kill technologies have been demonstrated to work, and the ballistic missile defense system has been successfully integrated. Over the last few years, the Missile Defense Agency has had 17 successes in the last 18 flighttests in the Patriot PAC-3, the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), THAAD, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) programs. Since 2001, there have been 27 out of 35 successful hit-to-kill midcourse and terminal intercepts.
Safety is very important when fi elding ballistic missile defenses. X-band radars have been operating for decades to observe weather and track aircraft and satellites. The beam from the radar is only several meters wide at 25 kilometers above the ground and is pointed into the sky and away from people on the ground. In fact, the U.S. has safely placed an X-band radar on the Kwajalein Atoll only a short distance from buildings that house workers and school children.
3. Would these missile defense capabilities threaten Russia?
No. The United States has kept, and is continuing to keep, Russia informed about U.S. missile defense policy, plans, and programs. We have used both bilateral diplomatic and Department of Defense-Ministry of Defense channels, as well as the multilateral NATO-Russia Council channel. Any prospective U.S. missile defense assets deployed in Europe would not be directed at Russia. Instead, these central European locations provide optimal defensive coverage against threats launched from the Middle East involving a limited number of intermediate- or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles launched at either Europe or the United States. U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe would not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, Russia is permitted between 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. Regardless of the location of any possible U.S. defensive assets, Russia’s large strategic offensive force could overwhelm the U.S. system’s limited number of deployed interceptors. Furthermore, in theoretical one-on-one engagements, U.S. interceptors in central Europe would not be capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs launched at the United States. As the graphic above demonstrates, there would not be suffi cient time to detect, track, and intercept ballistic missiles launched from western Russia toward the United States. Fielding U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe will not trigger an arms race between Russia and the United States. We have proposed transparency and confi dence-building measures to Russia. Additionally, in April 2007, senior U.S. offi cials tabled a comprehensive proposal for bilateral missile defense cooperation with Russia.
4. Would the X-band radar in the Czech Republic affect the use of cell phones, radios, garage door openers, and televisions?
No. Such personal devices operate outside the X-band frequency and would not be affected.
5. Would an intercept of a ballistic missile attack over Europe create debris that would fall on people in Europe?
Most debris from a successful destruction of a ballistic missile attack would burn up during reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere. Another way to look at this issue is to consider that any harm caused by this debris would pale in comparison to a successful nuclear attack on a European city.
Intercept Debris
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6. Can a ballistic missile defense capability have a deterrent effect?
Yes. Ballistic missile defense can work to deter the enemy because it reduces the political and military utility of offensive missiles. For example, if Allied deployed forces or civilian populations were defenseless, Iran may view its ballistic missile arsenal as an unchecked means to coerce other countries and/or even attack them. If Iran believes, however, that its ballistic missile attack might be defeated by a defensive system, it might be deterred from building up and using that arsenal to project its national power. Missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive deterrent capability; they instead constitute an additional and critical dimension of contemporary deterrence. Also, over the longer term, missile defenses discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles as the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction by undermining the military utility of these ballistic missiles.
7. Will the U.S. missile defense assets in Europe provide coverage to all countries in Europe?
• U.S. missile defense systems in Europe would have the capability to extend coverage to all European NATO Allies at risk from long-range ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. Additionally, there are several countries (e.g., Greece and Turkey) that are not at risk of a longrange missile attack from Iran due to their proximity to the threat. Rather, they are vulnerable to short- and medium-range attack, for which Iran has demonstrated capabilities
• The U.S. European assets could, in the future, be offered by the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic as a contribution to a NATO capability to defend against long-range threats, if NATO approves a military requirement to acquire a missile defense capability to protect population and territory against ballistic missiles of all ranges
• The future NATO ALTBMD capability or any NATO Member State’s missile defense system could complement the U.S. European missile defense deployments by providing coverage against shorter range threats
• Current NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) architecture and the U.S. BMDS C2BMC systems have been designed to be compatible, easing their integration
