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MISSILE DEFENSE PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE

Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets In Europe

The proposal to deploy components of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to Europe consists of:
 


•  European interceptor site
  - Up to ten silo-based long-range interceptors located in central Europe (2011-2013)

•  European midcourse radar
   - Relocation of a narrow-beam, midcourse tracking radar currently used in our Pacific test range to central Europe (2011)

   

Ten interceptors proposed to be based in Poland. These ground-based interceptors, nearly identical to those in Alaska and California, would be housed in underground silos in an interceptor field about the size of a football field. As with the interceptors based in Alaska and California, these interceptors are designed only for defensive purposes and employ small hit-to-kill vehicles (weighing about 75 kilograms) instead of explosives to destroy their targets at collision speeds in excess of 7 km per second and at more than 200 km above the earth’s surface.

The interceptors planned for Poland are nearly identical to the three-stage interceptors based in the U.S. except that they are a two-stage variant that is quicker, lighter, and better suited for the engagement ranges and timelines for Europe. The silos that house the ground-based interceptors have substantially smaller dimensions (e.g., diameter and length) than those used for offensive missiles, such as the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM. Any modifi cation would require extensive, lengthy, and costly changes that would be clearly visible to any observer.

The ground-based interceptors are comprised of a booster vehicle and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Upon launch, the booster fl ies to a projected intercept point and releases the EKV which then uses on-board sensors (with assistance from ground-based assets) to acquire the target ballistic missile. The EKV performs final discrimination and steers itself to collide with the enemy warhead, destroying it by the sheer kinetic force of impact.

A Midcourse Radar proposed for deployment to the Czech Republic. This X-band radar will be optimized to point its narrow beam at Iranian ballistic missile threats in fl ight. This is not a surveillance radar that scans continuously through 360 degrees, but instead uses information from early warning satellites and other transportable sea- and land-based sensors (such as mobile forward-based X-band radars placed closer to ballistic missile threat locations for earlier acquisition and precise tracking) to pinpoint or “cue” its very thin beam to fi nd and track ballistic missiles after they are launched. The emissions of this radar will not endanger people as the beam is extremely narrow (diameter of a couple of meters at a distance of 25 km) and must be elevated from ground level to acquire missiles in flight. X-band radars are used at most airports and do not pose a health risk. The X-band radar will not operate continuously 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The information obtained by this radar will be used to identify and distinguish the missile warhead from other missile parts (such as separated booster rockets) and potential countermeasures. Most importantly, it will be used to guide interceptor missiles to the projected trajectory of the ballistic missile warhead.

The radar proposed for deployment to the Czech Republic is currently located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands (central Pacifi c Ocean) where it has been used to support missile defense tests over the past decade. Upon completion of negotiations and site preparation, it will be relocated to Europe. It is important to note that this radar has successfully operated without any harmful effects to the people in the nearby family housing area or the children in the nearby school.

Command and control support composed of a network of computers and communications equipment. This network, part of the larger U.S. command and control system, transmits and receives data on threat missile launches, missile fl ight profi les, and projected target locations, that enable political and military leaders to determine when and where to launch weapons to intercept them. The system is designed to rapidly provide a wide range of information to decision makers because of the short distances in Europe and the great speed of ballistic missiles that require threat assessment and interceptor launch decisions in just minutes.

The command and control system enables approved decision makers and the operational crews to be alerted to ballistic missile launches, understand and assess the situation, make informed decisions, feed information to interceptors to fi nd and destroy incoming ballistic missile warheads, and then evaluate mission success.

Proposed U.S. Assets in Europe Supported by the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

The siting of ground-based interceptors in Poland and a midcourse radar in the Czech Republic is supported by other additional existing and developing assets of the global BMDS. The BMDS provides an integrated network of sensors, short- and medium-range interceptors, and command and control capabilities that can enhance the proposed U.S. European missile defense assets. The information required to assess and make interceptor launch decisions is enabled by the command and control and communications network provided by the global BMDS system, which is incorporating, assessing, and distributing crucial track information that is obtained by satellites, and/or by land-based and seabased radars and sensors.

U.S. PATRIOT, Aegis/SM-3, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could be made available to provide augmenting coverage for short- and medium-range threats. These assets could be used to support emerging NATO and national capabilities as needed to ensure layered coverage for all European nations requiring such protection. Transportable forward land-based radars could provide an enhancement to the capabilities of the proposed European interceptor and midcourse radar sites. This type of radar is a high-resolution, X-Band class, phasedarray radar based upon the THAAD radar hardware and software design. It is designed to be air transportable, roll-on/roll-off ship transportable, and rail transportable. The value of this radar is that when deployed closer to the threat, it provides earlier acquisition and more precise tracking data that expands coverage areas and extends ranges for more sophisticated engagement strategies. This type of radar is currently deployed in Japan. While deployment has not been proposed to potential host nations closer to the threat in the Middle East, an additional X-band radar will be available to support (as needed) proposed Europe-based U.S. missile defense assets.

• Forward-based radar
  - Available to deploy to area closer to Iranian threat to provide earlier detection, cueing, and enhanced tracking information

 

 

Why Poland and the Czech Republic?


• U.S. missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California do not provide protection for Europe

• Technical analysis shows that Poland and the Czech Republic are the optimal locations for fi elding U.S. missile defense assets in Europe:
 - Provides defensive coverage for the majority of Europe from longer-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East
 - Provides redundant coverage for the U.S. against ICBMs launched from the Middle East

• Placing the interceptor fi eld in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic maximizes the defensive coverage of both Europe and the United States

• As the following graphic demonstrates, Poland and the Czech Republic are geographically well located on the European continent to defend against longer-range ballistic missiles

 


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